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Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution(TF-QKD) protocol and its variants, such as Phase-
Matching QKD(PM-QKD), sending or not QKD(SNS-QKD) and No Phase Post-Selection TF-
QKD(NPP-TFQKD), are very promising for long-distance applications. However, there are still
some gaps between theory and practice in these protocols. Concretely, a finite-key size analysis is
still missing, and the intensity fluctuations are not taken into account. To address the finite-key size
effect, we first give the key rate of NPP-TFQKD against collective attack in finite-key size region
and then prove it can be against coherent attack. To deal with the intensity fluctuations, we present
an analytical formula of 4-intensity decoy state NPP-TFQKD and a practical intensity fluctuation
model. Finally, through detailed simulations, we show NPP-TFQKD can still keep its superiority
of high key rate and long achievable distance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution(QKD)[1, 2] is one of the most mature applications among the emerging quan-
tum technologies. It allows two remote users, called Alice and Bob, to share random secret keys even if there
is an eavesdropper, Eve[3–5]. Due to the loss of channel, both the key rate and achievable distance of QKD
are limited. Although increasing the secret key rate(SKR) and achievable distance are essentially significant
for the real applications of QKD, the theorists proved there are some limits on the improvement of SKR[6, 7].
In particular, for the channel of transmittance η, the linear bound [7], i.e. R 6 −log2(1−η), gives the precise
SKR bound for any point-to-point QKD without quantum repeaters. Surprisingly, a revolutionary protocol
called Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution(TF-QKD)[8] was recently proposed to beat this bound. In-
spired by the novel idea of TF-QKD, researchers proposed some variants and completed the corresponding se-
curity proofs [9–14]. From the view of experiments, these variants, i.e. Phase-Matching QKD(PM-QKD)[10],
sending or not QKD(SNS-QKD)[11] and No Phase Post-Selection TF-QKD(NPP-TFQKD)[12–14], are sim-
pler. Indeed, both the SNS-QKD and NPP-TFQKD have been scuccessfully demonstrated[15–18].
However, there are still some gaps between theory and implementation of TF-QKD. The first problem is
the finite-key size effect is still not considered previously. In Refs.[12–14], asymptotic SKR of NPP-TFQKD
is proposed, but the SKR in finite-key region is not given. On the other hand, the key-size in a practical
implementation is always finite, thus a framework to deal with the finite-key size effect in TF-QKD is
indispensable.
Another problem we will discuss is a potential security loophole of TF-QKD and its variants. Although
the Refs.[8–14] have proved the TF-QKD and its variants are information-theoretically secure even with
unstrusted measurement device just like the original measurement-device-independent protocol[19–22], the
imperfections of laser source may spoil the security. One of the intractable loopholes of source is the intensity
fluction[23–25]. In the existing security proofs of NPP-TFQKD, it is assumed that Alice and Bob are able to
accurately control the intensity of signal and decoy modes, which is not perfectly satisfied in experiment. In
this work, we also propose a countermeasure to tackle the internsity fluctuation of NPP-TFQKD. A key step
of our method is proposing the analytical formulas to deal with the 4-intensity decoy states in NPP-TFQKD.
In the original NPP-TFQKD[12], one must use linear programing to solve linear equations of decoy states
[26–30]. Compared with linear programing, analytical formula has superiorities on some special situations.
More importantly, the proposed analytical formulas are particularly convinient to be incorporated to our
intensity fluctuation. Another key step of our method is introducing a new intensity fluctuation model in
finite-key size regime. The model makes TF-QKD robuster to intensity fluctuation.
The rest of this paper is organized as followoing. Firstly, In Sec.II, we briefly review the flow of NPP-
TFQKD protocol. In Sec.III, we analyze the finite-key size effect of NPP-TFQKD, give the SKR formula
against coherent attack and evaluate the performance of TF-QKD in finite-key regime. In Sec.IV, the
analytical formulas for 4-intensity decoy state method are given. Then we introduce the intensity fluctuation
model and its countermeasure. Finally, a completed simulation taken both the finite-key size effect and
intensity fluctuation into account is present.
II. PROTOCOL DEFINITION
The setup of NPP-TFQKD[12] protocol is illustrated in Fig.1 and the flow is as following:
State preparation: This step will be repeated by N trials. In each trial, Alice(Bob) chooses code mode
or decoy mode with probabilities Pc and Pd = 1 − Pc respectively, sends corresponding quantum state to
untrusted Charlie.
When code mode is selected, Alice(Bob) prepares a phase-locked weak coherent pulse(WCP) |±√µ〉A(|±√
µ〉B), where the plus or minus of the quantum state depends on the bit value of Alice(Bob)’s random key
of this trial.
When decoy mode is selected, Alice(Bob) prepares a phase randomized WCP, whose intensity νa(νb) is
randomly choosen from a pre-decided set. Alice(Bob) actually prepares a mixed state since the randomized
phase in the decay mode will never be publicly announced. For instance, the density matrix of Alice’s WCP
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in decoy mode can be denoted as:
ρνa =
∞∑
n=0
e−νa
νna
n!
|n〉〈n|, (1)
where |n〉 is the Fock state.
Measurement: For each trail of the state preparation step, the untrusted Charlie must publicly announce
a single click of his single photon detector(SPD) ’SPD-L’ or ’SPD-R’ or non-click meassage. Note that Charlie
is untrusted, thus he is not necessarily to make the measurement shown in Fig.1.
Sifting: Alice and Bob publicly announce which trails are code mode and which are decoy mode. For the
trials they both choose code mode and Charlie announce ’SPD-L’ or ’SPD-R’ clicked, Alice and Bob will
retain this key bit. According to Charlie’s measurement result, Bob may decide to flip his key bit or not.
After this step, Alice and Bob generate sifted key bit string Z and Z ′ respectively.
Error correction: Alice sends λEC = nfH(Ec) bits of classical error correction data to Bob. Here
n=
∣∣Z∣∣= ∣∣Z’∣∣ is the size of sifted key bits, H(p) = −plog2p − (1 − p)log2(1 − p) is the Shannon entropy, Ec
is the error rate of sifted key bits and f > 1 denotes error correction efficiency. Depending on the error
correction data and Z ′, Bob obtains an estimated Zˆ of Z. Next, by applying universal2 hash fuction, Alice
sends λEV = log2
1
ǫcor
bits of error verification information to Bob. If the error verification fails, they output
an empty string and abort the protocol. Otherwise, they assume the error correction sucesses and Z = Z ′.
Parameter estimation and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob accumulate data to estimate gain
Qc of trials that they both choose code mode, gains Qxy of trials they choose decoy mode with intensity x
and y respectively. With these parameters and λEC , λEV , Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification, say,
apply a random universal2 hash function to Z and Zˆ respectively to generate lsec-length secure bit string S
and S′ respectively. The SKR per pulse is defined as R = lsec/N
FIG. 1. In Alice and Bob’s side, The laser-modules can prepare initial phase locked weak coherent pulses with the
help of the phase-locking module belongs to Charlie[16]. The phase-modulators(PM) are apply to encode key bits
in code mode and randomize the phase of WCPs in decoy mode. The intensity-modulators(decoy-IM) are set to
modualte different intensities to apply decoy state technique. VA denotes variable attenuator. The PM belongs to
Charlie can compensate phase drift caused by long-distance fiber. The gray square denotes 50:50 beam splitter and
the blue semicircles are single photon detectors(SPDs)
III. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS OF NPP-TFQKD
Previous works[12–14] of NPP-TFQKD are based on the asymptotic situation. However, since it’s im-
possible for Alice and Bob to send infinite pulses to generate their secure key in reality, the finite-key size
effect[31–34] must be taken into account. In this section, we first extend the asymptoic SKR formula of
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Ref.[12] to non-asymptotic one against collective attack. Then based on the postselection technique devel-
oped in Ref.[31], a formula against coherent attack is present.
A. Security definition and SKR against collective attack
As discussed above, in the end of NPP-TFQKD, Alice and Bob obtain a pair of bit string S and S′
respectively. Ideally, the bit strings are secure and applicable to any cryptosystem if two fundamental
conditions are met, namely correctness and secrecy. The correctness is, in simple terms, S = S′, which is
guarantted by the error verification. The secrecy requires Eve’s system E is decoupled from Alice’s key S,
which is illustrated by ρSE = US⊗ρE, where ρSE =
∑
s(|s〉〈s|⊗ρsE) denotes the density matrix of Alice and
Eve’s quantum state, US =
∑
s
1
|S| |s〉〈s| denotes the uniform mixture of all possible value of S, {|s〉} denotes
the orthonormal basis of Alice’s key S and ρsE is Eve’s the density matrix of Eve’s system conditioned that
Alice’s key S is in the state |s〉. Clearly, Alice’s key S is completely unknown to Eve in this ideal case.
However, in finite-key size regime, the ideal condition ρSE = US ⊗ ρE usually can’t be perfectly met. In
Ref.[35], a composoble secruity criteria is proposed. This criteria introduces secure parameters to describe
some small probabilities of the keys S and S′ varing from the ideal case. The protocol is ǫcor-correct if
P (S 6= S′) ≤ ǫcor, i.e. the probability of S 6= S′ is less than ǫcor. Similarly, the protocol is ǫsec-secret if
1
2
‖ρSE − US ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫsec, which means ρSE is ǫsec close to the ideal situation US ⊗ ρE , where the symbol‖M‖
1
denotes trace norm of matrix M . In general, if a protocol is ǫ-secure, ǫcor + ǫsec ≤ ǫ must hold. To
meet this criteria, with the same manner of Ref.[32], the SKR formula of NPP-TFQKD against collective is
given by
Rcol =
n
N
[
1− IAE
]− 1
N
λEC − 1
N
λEV − 2
N
log2
1
ǫPA
− 7
N
√
n log2(2/ǫs) , (2)
where n = P 2cQcN is the size of sifted key bits, IAE is the upperbound of Eve’s information on the sifted
key bit if she launches collective attack, λEV = log2
2
ǫcor
implies that P (S 6= S′) 6 ǫcor, ǫPA accounts for the
probability of failure of privacy amplification, and ǫs measures the accuracy of the estimating the smooth
min-entropy[32]. As shown in Ref.[12], the estimation of IAE against collectice attack depends on some
experimentally observed parameters including the gains Qc and Qxy. When the number of trials is finite, the
expectations of these gains may vary from the experimentally observed values due to statistical fluctuations.
Thus, another secure parameter ǫPE [34] characterizing the probablilty that parameter estimation fails must
be taken into account. For instance, consider a set of i.i.d. random variables X1X2...XN (Xi ∈ {0, 1}), the
observed frequency of bit 1 is usually not equal to its expectation E(X), provided N is finite. To solve this
problem, we apply large deviation theory, specifically, the Chernoff bound to estimate a confidence interval of
X according to the obeserved value. In NPP-TFQKD, we can apply Chernoff bound[34, 36, 37] to estimate
Qc and Qxy through the observed gains Qˆc and Qˆxy with a failure probability ǫPE respectively. For instance,
we have that the expectation value of the gain Qxy satisfied Q
−
xy ≤ Qxy ≤ Q+xy with probability 1 − ǫPE ,
where
Qxy ≥ Q−xy = Qˆxy(1 +
f(ǫ4PE/16)√
NxyQˆxy
),
Qxy ≤ Q+xy = Qˆxy(1 −
f(ǫ
3/2
PE)√
NxyQˆxy
),
(3)
, f(ǫ) =
√
2ln(ǫ−1), and Nxy denotes the total number of trails which Alice and Bob select decoy mode with
intensity x and y, respectively. As there are totally 11 gains to estimate in NPP-TFQKD [12], the probability
of occuring any failure in the estimations of 11 gains is 11ǫPE. Then applying the worst-case fluctuation
analysis in the calculation of linear programming[30, 36], we can bound Ynm(n+m ≤ 2), where Ynm is the
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probability of Charlie announcing a click message conditioned that Alice and Bob send Fock states |n〉 and
|m〉 respectively. Furthermore, with Eq.(2) in Ref.[12], we obtain IAE with the failure probability of 11ǫPE.
Finally, Alice and Bob generate NRcol bits secret key against collective attack with ǫcol-security. Ob-
viousely, ǫcol is not exceeding the sum of failure probabilities of error verification, privacy amplification,
accuracy of smooth min-entropy and parameters estimation, say,
ǫcol ≤ ǫPA + ǫcor + ǫs + 11ǫPE. (4)
Now we have introduced how to generate ǫcol-security keys against collective attack in NPP-TFQKD with
finite-key effect. Next, we discuss how to obtain ǫcoh-security keys against coherent attack.
B. Countermeasure of coherent attack
According to Ref.[31], it is proved that for a QKD protocol, the security against collective attack could be
extended to be against coherent attack easily. We introduce the following corollary from the theorem 1 of
Ref.[31] to tackle coherent attack in finite-key region.
Corollary. The key rate Rcoh against coherent attack could be given by
Rcoh = Rcol − 126log2(N + 1)
N
, (5)
while the key is ǫcoh-secure and
ǫcoh = ǫcol(N + 1)
63. (6)
Proof . The proof is based on the theorem 1 of Ref.[31] and very similar proofs can be found in Ref.[31]
and the appendix B of Ref.[32]. We denote HA, HB, andM are the Hilbert space of Alice’s ancilla A, Bob’s
ancilla B and Clarlie’s message M respectively. Without compriomising the security, Charlie’s messgage M
(click or not) can be treated as a quantum stated shared by Alice and Bob. The NPP-TFQKD protocol
using Eq.2 to generate keys could be viewed as a map E tranforming A, B and M into keys S and S′
(
∣∣S∣∣ = ∣∣S′∣∣ = NRcol) respectively. Let S be a hypothecal map tranforming imperfect keys S and S′ into
perfect ones and define F = S ◦E . Recall last subsection, it asserts that ‖((E −F)⊗ id)τHNKN‖1 6 ǫcol holds
when Eq.2 is used to generate keys, where the de Finetti-Hilbert-Schmidt state τHNKN =
∫
σ⊗NHKµ(σHK),
H = HA ⊗HB ⊗M, σHK is the pure state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve induced by any collective attack,
and µ(σHK) is the Haar measure on the pure state σHK.
Next, we consider Eve may control another ancilla R to obtain the purification τHNKNR of τHNKN . For
such a purification, dim(R) is not larger than (N + 1)d2−1[31] where d = dim(H ⊗ K) = 8. Through
controlling ancilla R, Eve’s min-entropy on sifted key is decreased at most 2(d2 − 1)log2(N + 1) bits. To
meet the security, Alice and Bob may perform protocol E ′, in which privacy amplification shortens the sifted
key into NRcol− 2(d2− 1)log2(N +1) bits. Then we have ‖((E ′−F ′)⊗ idKNR)τHNKNR‖1 6 ǫcol still holds,
where F ′ is a hypothecal map generating perfect keys.
Finally, we apply the theorem 1 of Ref.[31] and obtain
‖((E ′ −F ′)⊗ idKNR)ρHNKNR‖1 6 ‖((E ′ −F ′)⊗ idKNR)τHNKNR‖1 6 ǫcol(N + 1)d
2−1.
Since ρHNKNR is any state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve, this inequality clearly shows that the protocol E ′
is ǫcol(N + 1)
d2−1-secure for any coherent attack. Substituting d = 8, we end the proof. 
According to the corollary, if Alice and Bob want to generate ǫcoh-secure keys against any attack, they
will calculate the parameter ǫcol with Eq.6, and generate keys with the fromulae Eqs.5, 2 and 4.
To evaluate the performance of NPP-TFQKD in finite-key region, simulations in fiber channel are per-
formed here. We assume the dark-count rate of SPD is 10−10 per trial, the detection efficiency is 14.5% and
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optical misalignment is 1.5%. The attenuation of fiber is 0.2dB/km and the fiber tranmittance is 10−0.2L/10
where L is fiber length. The total secure parameter ǫcoh in Eq.6 is fixed as 10
−10. In addition to fixed
parameters above, there are some parameters should be optimized to maximize the SKR. There are 10
parameters should be optimized in total. The first set is decoy intensities µ, ν and ω. The second set is
probabilities of modes and intensities. Pc denote probabilities of choosing code mode and P
µ
d P
ν
d P
ω
d denote
probabilities of choosing decoy mode with intensity µ, ν, ω. It worth noting that probabilities of vacuum
state is P od = 1 − Pc − Pµd − P νd − Pωd . The number of pulses they both select code mode is NP 2c and they
select decoy mode with intensity x and y respectively is NP xd P
y
d . The other set is ǫPA, ǫcor, ǫs and ǫPE
satisfying Eq.4. Define ǫcor = ǫcolrcor, ǫcor = ǫcolrcor, ǫs = ǫcolrs and ǫPE = ǫcol(1− rsec − rcor − rs)/11.
The optimized paramters can be regarded as a vector ~v = [µ, ν, ω, Pc, P
µ
d , P
ν
d , P
ω
d , rsec, rcor, rs]. Noting that
the convex form of function Rcoh = F (~v)[38, 39] is not guaranteed, we choose particle swarm optimization
algorithm(PSO) which can optimize the non-smooth function and non-convex function[40] to search the best
~v to maximize the Rcoh.
The results of the simulations are illustrated in Fig.2 and 3. In Fig.2, we fix the pulses number N to be
1012, 1013, 1014 and simulate the SKR as a function of distance between Alice and Bon. In Fig.3 the distance
is fixed to be 50km, 100km and 150km, then we simulate the SKR as a function of N . The results show
that compared with asymptotic situation, the protocol still works well in non-asymptotic situations and the
linear bound is still overcomed when N ≥ 1012.
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FIG. 2. SKR versus distance between Alice and Bob for three different pulses number (N = 12: blue, N = 13: red,
N = 14: yellow). The purple dot-dash line is asymptotic SKR and the green dash line is the linear bound
IV. NPP-TFQKD WITH BOTH LARGE RANDOM INTENSITY FLUCTUATION AND
FINITE-KEY SIZE EFFECT
Except for finite-key size effect, a ubiquitous loophole in practical QKD system is intensity fluctuation[23–
25]. When applying decoy state technique, accurate intensity values are required to ensure the correct
estimation of Ynm[12]. However, it’s very difficult to control the intensity of WCP exactly in practical QKD
system since noise, time jitter, problem of modulation and other imperfections of devices. It brings potential
loopholes and may allow Eve to perform sophisticated attacks. In this section, we discuss the NPP-TFQKD
with large random intensity fluctuation in finite-key size regime. The main contribution of this section is that
we present a countermeasure of both large random intensity fluctuation and finite-key size effect of NPP-
TFQKD. By applying our method, the NPP-TFQKD with large random intensity fluctuation can remain its
advantage of breaking the linear bound.
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FIG. 3. Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of pulses number N for three different distance between
Alice and Bob(50km: blue, 100km: red, 150km: yellow). The solid lines denote non-asymptotic SKR and the dash
lines show corresponding asymptotic SKR
A. Analytical formula of 4-intensity decoy state method of NPP-TFQKD
Before proposing the intensity fluctuation model of NPP-TFQKD, we will introduce our analytical formula
of 4-intensity decoy state method. In ’Parameter estimation and privacy amplification’ step, the n-photon
yield can be estimated by linear programming or analytical formula[29, 30]. However, the analytical formula
of NPP-TFQKD is not given. In our countermeasure of imperfect WCP source loophole in next section, the
analytical formula is needed. To make the NPP-TFQKD more practical, the analytical formula of 4-intensity
decoy state method is proposed.
Define qnm = p
µ
np
µ
mYnm where p
x
n = e
−x xn
n! . To estimate the upper bound of IAE , we have to estimate
the upper bound of q00, q10, q01, q20, q02, q11 and lower bound of qsum = q00 + q10 + q01 + q20 + q02 + q11.
The upper and lower bound of Ynm can be estimated by applying linear programming whose constraints are
joint of:
Qxy =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
pxnp
y
mYnm (x, y ∈ {µ, ν, ω, o}), (7)
where 0 ≤ Ynm ≤ 1. Noting that these pxn depend on the intensity x, it’s obvious that the pxn in Eq.(7)
are uncertain and the linear programming will be not valid any more if we can’t control intensities exactly.
Intuitively, we can still get secure bound of key rate if we correctly replace coefficients pxn by its upper and
lower bound in analytical formula. Thus we present an analytical formula before building the fluctuation
model.
We will use superscript or subscript ′+′ and ′−′ to express, respectively, upper and lower bound of a
variable and we denote intensities in decoy mode by µ ,ν, ω, o where µ > ν > ω > o and o is the vacuum
state. It is worth noting that, the intensity of code mode should be the same as one of µ ,ν or ω. To make
our formula more clear, we suppose code mode intensity is µ and denote pµn p
ν
n p
ω
n by an, bn, cn.
Here we will demonstrate how to estimate n-photon yield by analytical formulas as follows. The details
are showed in Appendix.
Estimation of q00:
q00 = a
2
0Qoo.
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Upper bound of q10 and q01:
q+10 = a0a1
K2(c2a3 − c3a2) +K1(b2c3 − b3c2) +K3(a2b3 − a3b2)
b2(a1c3 − c1a3) + b1(c2a3 − c3a2) + b3(a2c1 − a1c2) , (8)
where K1 = Qµo − a0Qoo, K2 = Qνo − b0Qoo and K3 = Qωo − c0Qoo.
Expression of q+01 is similar, the difference is K1 = Qoµ − a0Qoo, K2 = Qoν − b0Qoo, K3 = Qoω − c0Qoo.
Upper bound of q20 and q02:
q+20 = a0a2
H1c1 − L3a1
a2c1 − a1c2 , (9)
where H1 = Qµo− a0Qoo, L3 = Qωo− c0Qoo− (
∑∞
n=3 cn). Formula of q
+
02 is similar but H1 = Qoµ − a0Qoo,
L3 = Qoω − c0Qoo − (
∑∞
n=3 cn).
Upper bound of q11:
q+11 = Qµµ − a0(Qµo +Qoµ) + a20Qoo. (10)
Lower bound of qsum:
We take two steps to calculate the q+sum. Define qsum = qt1 +qt2 , where qt1 = q00+q10+q01+q20+q02+q11
and qt2 = q11.
q−t1 = a0[Qoµ +Qµo − 2
∞∑
n=3
an]− a20Qoo ,
q−t2 = (a1)
2T1b1b2 − T2a1a2
a21b1b2 − b21a1a2
,
(11)
where T1 = Qµµ − a0(Qoµ +Qµo) + a20Qoo and T2 = Qνν − b0(Qoν +Qνo) + b20Qoo.
The lower bound of qsum is
q−sum = q
−
t1 + q
−
t2 . (12)
B. Estimation of average intensity
In this subsection, we briefly introduce the simple tomography technique proposed by Ref.[24]. Based on
this work, we propose a large random intensity fluctuation model in finite-key size regime.
As illustrated in Fig.4, Alice (Bob) should firstly produce a WCP with intensity 2x when she(he) actually
wants x. Before sending the WCP to Charlie, she (he) splits it by a 50:50 BS. One of the pulse is sent to
Charlie and the other one is measured by a local low dark-count SPD whose detection efficiency is η. After
sending Nx x-intensity WCPs, the local detector’s count number is nx where the dark count is ignored since
it’s orders of magnitude lower than light count. Because of the random fluctuations, whenever Alice (Bob)
wants to modulate intensity x, she (he) actually modulates xi = (1 + δi)x¯, where x¯ is the average intensity
and the instantaneous fluctuation δi is an unknow value. Mathematically, the click rate hx is:
hx =
Nx∑
i=0
(1− e−ηxi)/Nx. (13)
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As proof in Ref.[24], the upper and lower bound of x¯ is:
x¯ ≤ x+ = 1−
√
1− 2hx(1 + ζ)
η(1 + ζ)
,
x¯ ≥ x− = hx/η + h2x/2η − η2x3+/3! ,
(14)
where ζ =
∑
δ2i /Nx ≤ (Max{|δi|})2.
However, this conclusion in Ref.[24] can’t be used in non-asymptotic situations directly. Here we apply
large deviation theory to make the method met practice.
Noting that the distribution of intensity fluctuation is not independent identically distributed in most
cases, we choose Azuma’s inequality[41–43] rather than Chernoff bound to estimate the confidence interval
of hx. When the observed count number is nˆ, The upper and lower bound of hx is:
hx ≤ h+x = (nˆ+
√
2nˆln
1
ǫh
)/Nx ,
hx ≥ h−x = (nˆ−
√
2nˆln
1
ǫh
)/Nx ,
(15)
where the ǫh is secure parameter of estimation. Then the bound of the average intensity is corrected as
x¯ ≤ x+ =
1−
√
1− 2h+x (1 + ζ)
η(1 + ζ)
,
x¯ ≥ x− = h−x /η + (h−x )2/2η − η2x3+/3! .
(16)
FIG. 4. The main structure of simple tomography technique is showed in the red dash line box. Alice (Bob) does all
operations as usual except attenuate intensity to 2x when she (he) actually wants x, then she (he) splits it by a 50:50
BS. One of the pulse is sent to Charlie and the other is measured by a local low dark-count SPD. By observing the
count rate of the local SPD, Alice (Bob) can estimate the bound of average intensity. PM denotes phase modulator,
decoy-IM denotes intensity modulator. VA denotes variable attenuator. BS denotes 50:50 beam splitter and SPD
denotes single photon detector.
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C. Model of NPP-TFQKD with both intensity fluctuation and finite-key size effect
In this subsection, we will propose our countermeasure model. Firstly, we should define some symbols.
Let’s take the first decoy state(intensity is µ) as an example. When we want sent µ-intensity weak coherent
pulse, we actually prepare µi = µ¯(1+δi) since the intensity fluctuation. The intensity range is µ
± = µ¯(1+δ±)
where δ+ = Max{δi} and δ− = Min{δi}.
With definitions above, the density matrix of the source with fluctuation can be describe by:
ρ′µ =
Nµ∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
e−µi
µni
n!
|n〉〈n|/Nµ, (17)
and the an is re-written as:
an =
1
Nµ
Nµ∑
i=1
e−µi
µni
n!
= an =
µ¯ne−µ¯
n!Nµ
Nµ∑
i=1
e−δiµ¯(1 + δi)
n. (18)
By applying taylor expansion to Eq.(18), we get:
an =
µ¯ne−µ¯
n!Nµ
Nµ∑
i=1
(1− δiµ¯+ (δiµ¯)
2
2!
− ...)(1 + C1nδi + C2n(δi)2 + ...)
=
µ¯ne−µ¯
n!Nµ
[1 +
Nµ∑
i=1
(n− µ¯)δi + o(δi)].
(19)
Noting an important fact that
∑Nµ
i=1 δi = 0, we find the first order item of δ is not exist in Eq.(19). i.e, the
Eq.(19) can be re-written as:
an =
µ¯ne−µ¯
n!Nµ
[
Nµ∑
i=1
e−δiµ¯(1 + δi)
n −
Nµ∑
i=1
(n− µ¯)δi]. (20)
Define function fn(δ) = e
−δµ+(1 + δ)n − (n − µ+)δ, δ ∈ [δ−, δ+]. fn(δu) and fn(δl) are, respectively,
maximum and minimum values which can be easily found by optimization algorithms in interval [δ−, δ+]. δ
u
and δl are, respectively, maximum and minimum value points.
Noting that the function g(µ) = µ
ne−µ
n! is monotonically increasing function when n ≥ 1 and δ ∈ [−1, 1],
when n ≥ 0, we can obtain a tight bound of an as
an ≤ a+n =
(µ+)ne−µ
+
n!
f(δu),
an ≥ a−n =
(µ−)ne−µ
−
n!
f(δl).
(21)
Espacially, when n = 0,
a0 ≥ a−0 = e−µ
+
; a0 ≤ a+0 = e−µ
−
. (22)
However, without introduction of average intensity, when n ≥ 1:
an ≥ a−n =
e−µ
−
(µ−)n
n!
, an ≥ a+n =
e−µ
+
(µ+)n
n!
. (23)
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and when n = 0:
a0 ≥ a−0 = e−µ
+
, a0 ≤ a+0 = e−µ
−
. (24)
The difference between introducing average intensity or not is showed in Fig.5, it indicates that the
introduction of average intensity can significantly tighten the bound.
By substituting Eq.(3),(21) and (22) into our analytical formula, we can obtain bounds of qnm in uncertain
intensity and finite-key size regime.
Upper bound of q00:
q00 = (a
+
0 )
2Qoo;
Upper bound of q10 and q01:
We take q+10 as example, the q
+
01 is similar.
q+10 = a
+
0 a
+
1
K+2 (c
+
2 a
+
3 − c−3 a−2 )−K−1 (b+3 c+2 − b−2 c−3 )−K−3 (a+3 b+2 − a−2 b−3 )
b−2 (c
−
1 a
−
3 − a+1 c+3 )− b+1 (c−2 a−3 − c+3 a+2 ) + b−3 (a−2 c−1 − a+1 c+2 )
, (25)
where K−1 = Q
−
µo − a+0 Q+oo, K+2 = Q+νo − b−0 Q−oo and K−3 = Q−ωo − c+0 Q+oo.
Upper bound of q20 and q02:
We take q+20 as example.
q+20 = a
+
0 a
+
2
H+1 c
+
1 − L−3 a−1
a−2 c
−
1 − a+1 c+2
, (26)
where H+1 = Q
+
µo − a−0 Q−oo, L−3 = Q−ωo − c+0 Q+oo − (
∑∞
n=3 c
+
n ).
Upper bound of q11:
q+11 = Q
+
µµ − a−0 (Q−µo +Q−oµ) + a+0 2Q+oo. (27)
Lower bound of qsum:
q−sum = q
−
t1 + q
−
t2 ,
q−t1 = a
−
0 [Q
−
oµ +Q
−
µo − 2
∞∑
n=3
a−n − a+0 Q+oo] ,
q−t2 =
T−2 a
−
1 a
−
2 − T+1 b+1 b+2
(a+1 b
+
1 )(a
+
2 b
+
1 − a−1 b−2 )
,
(28)
where T+1 = Q
+
µµ − a−0 (Q−oµ +Q−µo − a+0 Q+oo) and T−2 = Q−νν − b+0 (Q+oν +Q+νo − b−0 Q−oo).
The simulation of NPP-TFQKD with both large random intensity fluctuation and finite-key size effect
is shown in Fig.6. We fix pulse number, dark-count rate, detection efficiency, misalignment, total secure
parameter ǫcoh and secure parameter of Azuma’s inequality in Eq.(15) ǫh to 10
14, 10−10 ,14.5%, 1.5%, 10−10
and 10−10 respectively. To emphasize the countermeasure of intensity fluctuation, we simulate the SKR
as a function of distance for different intensity fluctuation range and optimize SKR by PSO algorithm as
introduced in Sec.III. The simulation result in Fig.6 indicates that by applying our countermeasure model,
the large random intensity fluctuation has very limited influence on the performance of NPP-TFQKD.
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FIG. 5. We compare the upper and lower bound of an with two methods. The intensity is fixed at 0.5 and
n = 0, 1, 2, 3 in different figures. In these figures, the blue and red lines denote the upper bound and lower bound
respectively. The solid lines denote the model only considering fluctuation range and dash lines are our method which
introducing the average intensity. It’s obvious that our method estimates the bound much tighter.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have discussed some practical issues of NPP-TFQKD based on Ref.[12]. We firstly
analyzed the issue of finite-key size effect and solve this problem by applying post-selection technique for
quantum channels[31] and using Chernoff Bound to estimate statistic fluctuations of observed values. The
simulation shows that NPP-TFQKD works well in non-asymptotic situations.
Another contribution of this work is we propose a countermeasure of intensity fluctuation. We introduce
an analytical formula of decoy state method to meet the needs of our fluctuation model. Then we propose
our intensity fluctuation model to deal with large random intensity fluctuation problem in the source side.
Our model is practical since it doesn’t need any extra information except average intensity and fluctuation
range. Our simulation results suggest that by applying our method,the non-asymptotic SKR can still break
the linear bound even if the large random intensity fluctuation is taken into account.
This work has been supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant
No. 2016YFA0302600), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61822115, 61775207,
61702469, 61771439, 61622506, 61627820, 61575183), National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No.
MMJJ20170120) and Anhui Initiative in Quantum Information Technologies.
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FIG. 6. Asymptotic secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of distance between Alice and Bob for different
fluctuations and pulses number(δ± = ±0%: blue, δ± = ±20%: red, δ± = ±50%: yellow. N = 1014: solid lines,
N = 1013: dash lines). The green dot-dash line denotes linear bound.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF ANALYTICAL FORMULA
Firstly, we should introduce an important conclusion[29, 30]. |µ〉 and |ν〉 are coherent states, intensity µ
is larger than ν. When m > n, there is:
pµm
pνm
≥ p
µ
n
pνn
(µ ≥ ν ; m ≥ n). (29)
Upper bound of q00:
The Y00 = Qoo since o is vacuum state. Thus:
q00 = a
2
0Y00 = a
2
0Qoo. (30)
Upper bound of q01 and q10:
We take q+01 as an example and the proof of q
+
10 is similar. Define K1 = Qoµ − a0Qoo, K2 = Qoµ − b0Qoo,
K3 = Qoµ − c0Qoo. Noting that Qox − px0Qoo = px1Y01 + px2Y02 + px2Y02 + ...., We get an equation set:


K1 = a1Y01 + a2Y02 + a3Y03 + ....
K2 = b1Y01 + b2Y02 + b3Y03 + ....
K3 = c1Y01 + c2Y02 + c3Y03 + ....
(31)
.
By applying conclusion(29) and defining τ =
∑∞
k=3 bkY0k, we can derive inequalities:


K1b3/a3 > a1b3Y01/a3 + a2b3Y02/a3 + τ
K2 = b1Y01 + b2Y02 + τ
K3b3/c3 < c1b3Y01/c3 + c2b3Y02/c3 + τ
(32)
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By solving Eq.(32), we obtain:
Y01 ≤ Y +01 =
K2(c2a3 − c3a2) +K1(b2c3 − b3c2) +K3(a2b3 − a3b2)
b2(a1c3 − c1a3) + b1(c2a3 − c3a2) + b3(a2c1 − a1c2) . (33)
The upper bound of q01 is:
q+01 = a0a1Y
+
01 . (34)
Upper bound of q02 and q20 :
We take q+02 as an example. According to Eq.(7), we have:
Qoµ ≥ a0Y00 + a1Y01 + a2Y02;
Qoω ≤ c0Y00 + c1Y01 + c2Y02 + (c3 + c4 + c5 + ....). (35)
Noting that Qoo = Y00 and defining H1 = Qoµ − a0Qoo and L3 = Qoω − c0Qoo − (c3 + c4 + c5 + ....), we
obtain:
{
H1 > Y01a1 + Y02a2
L3 < Y01c1 + Y02c2
(36)
By solving Eq.(36), we obtain:
Y02 < Y
+
02 =
H1c1 − L3a1
a2c1 − a1c2 . (37)
The upper bound of q02 is:
q+02 = a0a2Y
+
02 . (38)
. Upper bound of q11:
It’s easily to calculate q11 by using Qµµ, Qµo, Qoµ and Qoo:
q11 <
∞∑
n=1,m=1
anamYnm = Qµµ − a0Qµo − a0Qoµ + (a0)2Qoo. (39)
Thus the upper bound of q11 is:
q+11 = Qµµ − a0Qµo − a0Qoµ + (a0)2Qoo. (40)
Lower bound of q00 + q01 + q10 + q02 + q20 + q11: Define qsum =
∑2
n=0
∑2−m
m=0 qnm, qt1 = q00 + q01 +
q10 + q02 + q20 and qt2 = q11. Obviously there is qsum = qt1 + qt2 .
Firstly, we estimate the lower bound of qt1 . It’s obviously that:
qt1 > q
+
t1 = a0[Qoµ +Qµo − 2(a3 + a4 + a5 + ....)] − (a0)2Qoo. (41)
Then we estimate the lower bound of qt2 . Similar to the estimation of q
+
01, by defining T1 = Qµµ−a0(Qoµ+
Qµo) + (a0)
2Qoo, T2 = Qνν − a0(Qoν + Qνo) + (a0)2Qoo and τ ′ =
∑∞
m=1
∑∞
n=1 bmbnYm,n − (b1)2Y1,1, we
obtain an equation set:
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

T1b1b2
a1a2
<
a1b1b2Y1,1
a2
+ τ ′
T2 = (b1)
2Y1,1 + τ
′
(42)
Solve the Eq.(42), we obtain:
Y11 ≥ Y −11 =
T1b1b2 − T2a1a2
a21b1b2 − b21a1a2
, (43)
and the lower bound of qt2 is:
q−t2 = a
2
1Y
−
11 . (44)
Our target, i.e. the lower bound of qsum is:
q−sum = q
−
t1 + q
−
t2 . (45)
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